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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 On appeal in this post-conviction proceeding, Wayne D. Anderson, II, asserted 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motions to proceed as a pro se 
litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend time to prepare an amended 
petition, because the district court did not recognize his right to self-representation. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Mr. Anderson had not shown the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied the motions, because he did not show 
any valid basis for discharging his appointed counsel or further delaying the case.  
(Resp. Br., pp.5-10.) 
 This Reply Brief is necessary to address certain of the State’s arguments.  
Contrary to the State’s argument that the motions were untimely, Mr. Anderson asserts 
the motions were timely filed.  Further, the State contends any abuse of discretion in 
denying the motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel was harmless because the 
district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to extend time to prepare 
petition.  Despite that argument, Mr. Anderson asserts his substantial rights were 
prejudiced because he was left unable to exercise his right to self-representation.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Anderson’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motions to 
proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his time to 
prepare an amended petition? 
 
 
 3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s Motions To 
Proceed As A Pro Se Litigant, Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel, And Extend His Time 
To Prepare An Amended Petition 
 
 Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his 
time to prepare an amended petition.  The district court did not recognize 
Mr. Anderson’s right to self-representation.  Mr. Anderson had a right to proceed pro se.  
(See generally App. Br., pp.9-12.)  As a corollary to his right to self-representation, 
Mr. Anderson had a right to dismiss court-appointed counsel.  (See generally App. 
Br., pp.12-14.)  The district court abused its discretion when it denied those motions 
because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. 
 The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motion 
to extend his time to prepare an amended petition.  (See generally App. Br., pp.15-16.)  
Because Mr. Anderson chose to proceed pro se but was not present at the status 
conference, he needed a continuance to exercise his right to self-representation, and 
being left unable to exercise that right meant Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were 
prejudiced by the denial of the motion.   
 In the Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Anderson’s requests “were 
untimely,” because he did not ask to proceed pro se “until approximately six months 
after the court granted his motion for appointment of counsel, approximately two and 
one-half months after the court entered its notice of intent to summarily dismiss the 
petition, and only after [Mr.] Anderson’s appointed counsel requested, and was granted, 
two extensions of time to respond to the court’s notice.”  (Resp. Br., pp.8-9 (citations 
 4 
omitted).)  The State contends the district court “appropriately considered the late timing 
of [Mr.] Anderson’s request, and acted within its discretion to prevent further delays.”  
(Resp. Br., p.9 (citation omitted).)   
 Contrary to the State’s argument, Mr. Anderson’s motions were timely filed.  
Mr. Anderson submitted the motions for mailing on October 8, 2015, before the 
October 10, 2015 deadline set by the district court when it granted post-conviction’s 
counsel request for a second extension of time to respond to the notice of intent to 
dismiss.  (See R., pp.102-03, 106.)  Pursuant to the “mailbox rule,” which provides 
documents are deemed filed by pro se inmates when the documents are submitted for 
mailing, the motions were timely filed as of October 8, 2015.  See Munson v. State, 128 
Idaho 639, 643 (1996) (holding “the mailbox rule applies for purposes of pro se inmates 
filing petitions for post-conviction relief”). 
 Further, considering post-conviction counsel requested both extensions to get 
“additional time in which to respond to the Court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss the petition 
in this matter” (see R., pp.92, 99), Mr. Anderson would have reasonably expected post-
conviction counsel to file a response.  Thus, even if the October 10, 2015, deadline did 
not apply, the time for Mr. Anderson to file the motions would not have started to accrue 
until Mr. Anderson learned post-conviction counsel did not actually intend to file a 
response to the notice of intent to dismiss.  (See also Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.19-25 
(post-conviction counsel informing the district court he had previously advised 
Mr. Anderson he was not going to file an amended petition, and the witnesses 
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Mr. Anderson had given him did not change his position).)  Under the unique 
circumstances of this case, Mr. Anderson’s motions were timely filed.1 
 The State also contends, “even if the district court abused its discretion by failing 
to permit [Mr.] Anderson to discharge his appointed counsel, such error is harmless 
because the court, as discussed above, acted well within its discretion in denying 
[Mr.] Anderson’s motion for a continuance.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  The State argues, “even if 
[Mr.] Anderson had the right to discharge his counsel, his post-conviction petition would 
still have been summarily dismissed after the district court denied the motion to continue 
the case.  Therefore, [Mr.] Anderson cannot demonstrate prejudice.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.) 
 Despite the above argument, Mr. Anderson asserts his substantial rights were 
prejudiced because he was left unable to exercise his right to self-representation.  
Under the State’s argument, the district court abused its discretion by not permitting 
Mr. Anderson to dismiss court-appointed counsel, but nonetheless properly denied the 
motion to extend his time to prepare an amended petition (i.e., a motion to allow 
Mr. Anderson to exercise his right to self-representation after dismissing counsel).   
                                            
1 The State additionally argues, “[e]ven in the context of the established constitutional 
right of self-representation at a criminal trial, a court may consider the timeliness of the 
request for self-representation in determining whether to grant the request.”  (Resp. 
Bar., p.8 (citing State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597 (Ct. App. 2007).)   
 However, that timeliness standard as articulated by the federal appellate courts 
generally provides “a demand for self-representation is timely if made before meaningful 
trial proceedings have begun.”  E.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 
1986); accord United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1991).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held, “[t]he right of a defendant in a criminal 
case to act as his own lawyer is unqualified if invoked prior to the start of the trial.”  
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
384 U.S. 1007 (1966).  Mr. Anderson submits the post-conviction summary disposition 
stage, as part of the proceedings before a possible evidentiary hearing, is equivalent to 
the pretrial stage of a criminal case.  Thus, even by analogy to the constitutional 
standard for criminal cases, Mr. Anderson’s motions were timely filed. 
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 Further, Mr. Anderson was not present at the status conference where the district 
court denied the motion to extend time to prepare petition.  (R., p.107.)  Thus, if the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss court-appointed 
counsel, the State’s argument would mean it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
district court to deny the motion to extend time to prepare petition even though 
Mr. Anderson lacked any real representation at the status conference.  This Court 
should reject the State’s harmlessness argument because it would create such 
anomalous situations. 
 The State has not shown the district court’s abuse of discretion in denying the 
motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel was harmless.  The denial of the motion to 
extend his time to prepare an amended petition meant Mr. Anderson was unable to 
exercise his right to self-representation and file an amended petition or other response 
to the notice of intent to dismiss.  The surrounding circumstances therefore indicate 
Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the denial of his motion to extend 
time to prepare petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s order and 
judgment dismissing his post-conviction petition, reverse the district court’s order 
denying his motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, 
and extend time to prepare an amended petition, and remand the matter to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 2nd day of November, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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